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The U.S. market has generally been more hospitable to imports
from developing countries than have the markets of other indus-
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The United States has ofteni  been criticized for  data on the share of imports subject to nontariff
protectionist measures taken against developing  measures for gauging the protective effects of
country products.  Yet, average agricultural  such measures and in part in the reliance on
protection has remained practically nil in the  formal measures of protection in the United
United States over time while rising in the  States as against the use of informal measures in
European Common Market and, even more,  Japan.
Japan.  It further appears that manufactured
imports from developing countries have in-  More generally , one may explain the results
creased much more rapidly, and reached higher  obtained by reference to the openness of the
levels, in the United States than in the European  U.S. market that has generally been more
Common Mar"e, and, in particular, Japan.  hospitable to imports from developing countries
than have the markets of other industrial coun-
The U.S.-Japan comparisons for manufac-  tries, particularly Japan.  This has been the case
tured goods do not conform to the data on the  even for clothing and textiles, where developing
extent of nontariff barriers, as measured by the  countries have in large part gotten around the
share of imports from the developing countries  restrictions by introducing new fibers and
which are subject to such barriers. The solution  upgrading products.
to the puzzle lies in part in the inadequacies of
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Bank.U. S.  TRADE  POLICY  TOWARDS  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
A policy  adviser  to  developing  countries,  who recommends  greater
outward  orientation  for  these  countries,  often  encounters  the  reply  that
protectionism  in  the  industrial  world  in  general,  and  in the  United  States  in
particular,  thwarts  the  efforts  of countries  that  attempt  to  open their
economies.  The  criticisms  tend  to  be concentrated  on the  United  States,  which
has the  largest  domestic  market  and  whose  actions  have  attracted  the  greatest
publicity.
This  paper  will  review  the  measures  applied  by the  United  States  in
regard  to  its  imports  from  the  developing  countries  as well  as  actual  changes
in  these  imports. In  the  course  of the  discussion,  comparisons  with other
major  industrial  countries,  the  European  Common  Market  and  Japan,  will  also  be
made.
I.  Nontariff  Barriers  to Imports
As is  well-known,  industrial  country  tariffs  have  been  greatly
reduced  in the  course  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  undertaken  since  the
Second  World  War.  Tariff  reductions  have  been  extended  to imports  from  the
developing  countries  under  the  most-favored-nation  clause,  even  though  these
countries  have  offered  few  concessions  of their  own.
While  the  lack  of reciprocal  concessions  hat,  meant  that  tariffs  have
been  lowered  less  on products  of interest  to  the  developing  countries  than
overall,  the  reductions  have  been  very  substantial.  Thus,  post-Tokyo  Round
import  duties  on semimanufactures  and  finished  manufactures  originating  in  the
developing  countries  average  only  8.7  percent  in  the  United  States,  6.7percent  in  the  European  Common  Markct;  and  6.8  percent  in  Japan.  I!
Furthermore,  within  certain  limits  and  excluding  so-called  sensitive  items,
duty-free  entry  has  been  provided  for  imports  from  the  developing  countries
under  the  General  Scheme  of Preferences.
It  has  been  charged,  however,  that  reductions  in tariffs  have  been
more than  offset  by the  increased  application  of nontariff  measures  that  limit
imports  in  quantitative  terms. Among  these  measures,  quantitative  import
restrictions,  including  import  prohibitions,  quotas,  and impcrt  licensing,  as
well  as so-called  voluntary  export  restraints,  limit  imports  directly. In
turn,  variable  import  le'ies,  minimum  price  requirements  for imports,
"'voluntary"  export  price  restraints,  and tariff  quotas,  involving  the
imposition  of higher  duties  above  a pre-determined  import  quantity,  have  an
indirect  effect  on imports.
Table  1  provides  information  on the  share  of imports  subject  to
nontariff  measures,  calculated  by using  world  trade  weights. The  use  of  world
trade  weights  allows  for  differences  in the  relative  importance  of individual
tariff  items  in interrational  trade  while  abstracting  from  the  idiosyncracies
of national  protection.  2/  In  contrast,  calculating  for  a particular  country
the  percentage  share  of imports  subject  to  restrictions  is equivalent  to using
own  imports  as  weights,  which  means  that  the  more  restrictive  the  measure  the
1/  The  corresponding  figures  for  total  imports  are  4.9,  6.7  and  6.8  percent
(GATT,  1980,  pp.  33-37).
2/  Nevertheless,  to the  extent  that  all,  or  most,  developed  countries  apply
quantitative  import  restrictions  to  the  same  commodities,  for  example
textiles,  their  share  in  world  trade  will  be lowered,  thereby  affecting
the  world  trade-weighted  average  of nontariff  measures  (Balassa  and
Michalopoulos,  1987).-3-
Table  1
Relative  Shares  of Imports  from  the  Developing  Countries
Subject  to  Nontariff  Measures,  1985
(World  Trade  Weighted)
US  EEC  Japan
Nonfuel  products,  together  12.9  21.8  10.5
Agriculture  11.8  27.5  30.2
Manufacturing,  total  14.4  21.4  5.4
Textiles  and  clothing  65.3  65.2  14.2
Footwear  0.0  12.5  42.2
Iron  and  Steel  4.5  28.9  0.0
Electrical  machinery  0.0  4.7  0.0
Transport  equipment  0.0  4.6  0.0
Other  manufactures  1.9  5.3  1.9
Source: Nogues,  Olechowski,  and  Winters,  (1986)  and the  sources
cited  therein.- 4 -
lower  its  weight  in the  calculations;  in  the  extreme,  prohibitive  restrictions
have  zero  weight.  1/
Table  1 reports  on nontariff  barriers  for  nonfuel  imports  and,  within
this  total,  for  agricultural  and  for  manufactured  imports  in the  United
States,  the  European  Common  Market,  and  Japan;  it further  disaggregates
manufactured  goods  into  textiles  and  clothing,  footwear,  iron  and steel,
electrical  machinery,  transport  equipment,  and  other  manufactures.  Fuels  have
not  been'  included  because  the  nontariff  measures  applied  do not  appear  to  aim
at protecting  the  domestic  production  of competing  products,  such  as coal.
The  data  show  that  the  United  States  applies  nontariff  measures  to  a
smaller  proportion  of its  agricultural  imports  originating  in  the  developing
countries  than  does  either  the  European  Common  Market  or Japan. This  result
reflects  the  fact  that  while  the  United  States  protects  its  sugar  growers  from
imports  originating  in the  developing  countries,  in the  EEC  and  Japan
protection  extends  to  much  of temperate  zone  agriculture.
The scope  of  manufactured  imports  from  the  developing  countries  that
are  subject  to  nontariff  measures  is also  smaller  in the  United  States  than  in
the  European  Common  Market. This  is so for  all  product  categories  other  than
textiles  and  clothing,  the  imports  of  which  are  limited  under  the  Multifiber
Arrangement  (MFA)  in  both  cases. Thus,  in  contrast  to the  Common  Market,  the
United  States  does  not employ  nontariff  measures  to limit  the  imports  of
footwear,  electrical  machinery,  and  transport  equipment  from  the  developing
1/ A case  in  point  is the  restrictions  imposed  on  automobile  imports  from
Japan. While  U.S.  imports  were  set  at over  20 percent  of domestic  sales,
the  French  quota  equals  3  percent  of sales  and  Italy  admits  11,000
automobiles  from  Japan.countries. And,  the  share  of commodities  subject  to such  barriers  is  lower  in
the  United  States  than  in the  EEC  in the  case  of iron  and steel  as well  as for
other  manufactures.
The  reported  share  of mianufactured  goods  imported  from  developing
countries  that  are  subject  to  nontariff  measures  is  lower  in  Japan  than  in the
United  States. This is  because  Japan  does  not limit  its  textiles  and  clothing
imports  in the  framework  of the  MFA  and,  apart  from  footwear,  it  has  few
formal  restrictions  on  manufactured  imports  in  the  remaining  categories.  But,
Japan  has imposed  limitations  on textiles  and  clothing  imported  from
developing  countries  whenever  such  imports  assumed  importance  and  has  used
informal  measures  of protection  in  regard  to  various  other  manufactured  goods
(Balassa,  1986a). The  effects  of these  measures  will  be apparent  as  we
consider  the  growth  of imports  from  developing  countries  in Section  III  below.
II.  Other  Border  Measures
The  data  reported  in  Table  1  do  not include  other  border  measures
that  could,  but  may  not,  be used  with  protective  intent. Countervailing
actions,  taken  in response  to export  subsidies,  and  anti-dumping  actions,
taken  in  response  to sales  below  cost  or below  the  home-market  price,  as well
as the initiation  of investigations  into  such  unfair  trading  practices  and  the
monitoring  of imports  have  been  classified  in  this  category  (Nogues,
Olechowski,  and  Winters,  1986).  11
I/ Health  and  safety  measures  and  technical  standards  may  also  be  used  with  a
protective  intent,  but  the  relevant  data  are  difficult  to obtain.
Furthermore,  in concentrating  on border  measures,  the  discussion  excludes
domestic  measures,  such  as production  subsidies  which  also  bear  on
imports.-6-
Some  authors  have included  countervailing  and  antidumping  actions,
investigations  into  unfair  practices,  and the  monitoring  of imports  with  the
nontariff  barriers  described  in  Section  I  above  and  report  data  by combining
the  two  sets  of  measures  (Nogues,  Olechowski,  and  Winters,  1986).  11  To
evaluate  this  practice,  the  countervailing  actions  initiated  in  the  United
States  will  be examined  in the  following.
As shown  in  Table  2, in  the  first  half  of the 19809  substantial
increases  occurred  in  the  number  of petitions  for  countervailing  action
against  developing  country  exporters  in the  United  States. There  were 112
such  cases  in 1980-85,  compared  with  2 cases  in !973-74  and  45 in 1975-79. By
contrast 1 in  the  European  Common  Market  and  Japan,  respectively,  there  were
only  3  and 1  countervailing  duty  cases  in the  1980-85  period  (Nam,  1986,
Tables  2 and  3).
While  the  number  of countervailing  actions  against  developing
countries  increased  in  the  United  States,  the  number  of such  actions  against
industrial  countries  declined  compared  with the  1975-79  period  (Table  2).
This  divergence  may  be explained  by the  fact  that  the  Tokyo  Round  code  on
subsidies  reaffirmed  the  prohibition  of export  subsidies  by the  industrial
countries  while  for  developing  countries  it  maintained  the  possibility  of
granting  export  subsidies.  Also,  the  large  majority  of  countervailing  actions
were  initiated  against  highly-indebted  Latin  American  countries  that
1/  The  initiation  of actions  against  such  unfair  trading  practices  and  the
monitoring  of imports  have  also  been  included  in the  calculations.-7-
Table  2
Countervailing  Actions  In  the  United  States  Against  Industrial
and  Developing  Country  Exporters  (1970-1987)
Final  Outcome
Average
Number  of  Alternative  countervalIing
Year  Exporter  Initiations  Affirmative  Arrangements  I/  Negative  2/  Pending  duty  rates  3
1970-74 Industrial  9  8  0  1  0  n.a.
Developing  2  2  0  0  0  n.a.
1975-79 Industrial  59  20  0  39  0  n.a.
Developing  45  18  0  27  0  n.a.
1980  Industrial  2  0  0  2  0  0
Developing  6  5  1  0  0  8.3
1981  Industrial  6  0  1  5  0  0
Developing  4  1  1  2  0  15.8
1982  Industrial  30  3  16  11  0  11.5
Developing  31  13  13  5  0  10.2
1983  Industrial  3  2  0  1  0  10.7
Developing  13  7  1  5  0  10.9
1984  Industrial  10  4  1  5  0  8.6
Developing  30  11  7  12  0  12.7
1985  Industrial  12  5  2  5  0  15.5
Developing  28  10  4  14  0  21.5
1986  Industrlal  8  4  1  3  0  4.8
Developing  20  12  2  6  0  37.8
1987  Industrial  3  1  0  2  0  25.1
Developing  6  2  0  1  3  32.8
1980-87 Industrial  74  19  21  34  0  11.3
Developing  138  61  29  45  3  18.4
1/ Cases  withdrawn  urder  an  alternative  arrangement  involving  e.g.  the  elimination  of subsidies.
2/  Cases  withdrawn  voluntarily  by petitioners  or rejected  by  the  authorities.
3/  Simple  average  of  subsidy  rates  for  affirmative  cases.
Source: Table  prepared  by  Ms. Azita  Amjadi  of  the  World  Bank.-8-
instituted  export  subsidies  during  the  period  under  consideration,  1/  and the
share  of affirmative  decisions  was  generally  greater,  and  countervailing  duty
rates  substantially  higher,  in  the  case  of these  countries  than  for  the  Far
East.  2/
At the same  time,  an increasing  number  of petitions  for
countervailing  action  initiated  against  developing  countries  in  the  United
States  were settled  by  alternative  arrangements,  which  did  not  involve  the
application  of countervailing  duties. In  particular,  the  exporter's
government  removed  the  subsidies  that  had  given  rise  to the  petitior.  the
first  place.
In turn,  the  share  of negative  decisions  in the  total  declined  by
nearly  one-half  between  1975-79  and  1980-85. All  in  all,  the  share  of
affirmative  decisions  in  countervailing  actions  initiated  aginst  developing
countries  remained  approximately  the  same,  amounting  to two-fifths  of the
total. But  affirmative  decisions  accounted  for  only  one-and-a-half  percent  of
U.S. imports  from  these  countries  in  1980-85,  and  the  average  countervailing
duty levied  was 13.2  percent. Thus,  the  additional  duty imposed  was less  than
0.2  percent  of U.S.  imports  from  the  developing  countries.
1/  In the  1980-85  period,  there  were 26 such  actions  against  Mexico,  16
against  Brazil,  6  against  Peru,  and 5  each  against  Argentina  and
Venezuela. This  compares  with  8  actions  against  Korea,  3  against
Singapore  and  Taiwan  each,  and  none  against  Hong  Kong  although  the  latter
has  larger  exports  to the  United  States  than  any  Latin  American  country,
2/  In 1980-85,  the  share  of affirmative  decisions  in the  total  was  80 percent
in  Argentina,  31 percent  in  Brazil,  38  percent  in  Korea,  54 percent  in
Mexico,  67 percent  in Peru,  and  nil in  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  Venezuela;
average  countervailing  duty  rates  were 15.8  percent  for  Argentina,  14.1
percent  for  Brazil,  2.4  percent  for  Korea,  10.8  percent  for  Mexico,  and
22.7  percent  for  Peru  (Nam,  1986,  Table  4).-9-
The  number  of countervailing  duty  cases  against  developing  countries
declined  to  a considerable  extent  in  recent  years. Countervailing  action  was
initiated  in  k,  cases  in 1986,  compared  with  30 such  cases  in 1984  and  28
cases  in 1985. Moreover,  there  were  only  6 cases  of countervailing  action
initiated  against  developing  countries  in  1987.
The  time  pattern  of countervailing  duty  caaes  may  be explained  by
changes  in  the  value  of the  U.S.  dollar. Thus,  the  increased  number  of
countervailing  duty  petitions  after  1980  may  find  their  origin  in  the  growing
overvaluation  of the  U.S.  dollar  that  accentuated  the  injury  due  to export
subsidies. In turn,  the  subsequent  depreciation  of the  dollar  may  have
contributed  to  the  observed  decline  in the  number  of  countervailing  duty  cases
by offsetting  the  injury  due to  export  subsidization.
Between  1980  and 1985,  the  dollar  appreciated  by 29 percent  in  real
terms,  calculated  by  adjusting  the  trade-weighted  average  of the  nominal
exchange  rate  for  changes  in  wholesale  prices  in  the  United  States  and  abroad;
the  extent  of appreciation  was  more  than  double  the  average  rate  of
countervailing  duties  applied  during  this  period. In turn,  the  dollar
depreciated  by 35  percent  in real  terms  between  1985  and 1987.
At the  same  time,  countervailing  actions  are  "GATT-conforming"  as
they  are  sanctioned  by  Article  VI of the  General  Agreement  and  they  correct
distortions  due to  export  su',sidies.  And  while  it  has been  argued  that  the
negative  correlation  between  comparative  advantage  and  countervailing  and
anti-dumping  actions  reflect  a bias  toward  protectionism  (Finger,  Hall,  and
*elson,  1982),  it stands  to reason  that  industries  suffering  from  foreign
competition  will initiate  such  actions. This  will  be the  case,  in particular,
when  the  injury  test  is applied,  since  industries  that  are  at a comparative- 10  -
disadvantage  are  likely  to sufferian  injury  as a result  of export
subsidization  abroad.
It should  further  be noted  that  countervailing  and  anti-dumping
actions  involve  the  imposition  of duties  and  are  thus  different  in  character
from  nontariff  measures  that  limit  imports  in  quantitative  terms. One  may
also  query  the inclusion  of investi!ations  of unfair  trading  practices  and the
monitoring  of imports  under  nontariff  measures. While  uncertainty  is  created
thereby,  this  does  not  represent  the  actual  application  of  nontariff  measures.
11  Thus,  it is  appropriate  to  limit  the  scope  of nontariff  measures  to the
actions  included  in  Table  1.
III. Nontariff  Protection  and  Imports
The  next  question  concerns  the  protective  effects  of  nontariff
measures. For  this  purpose,  the  tariff  equivalent  of such  measures  may  be
calculated.  Under  competitive  conditions,  this  can  be expressed  as the
percentage  difference  between  domestic  and  international  prices  or the  nominal
rate  of protection.
t3ominal  rates  of protection  have  been  estimated  for  agricultural
products. While  the  averages  have  been  calculated  for  a  group  of products
that  have  varying  importance  for  the  developing  countries,  the  data  indicate
the  overall  level  of agricultural  protection  in  the  industrial  countries  as
well  as changes  over  time.
1/  It should  be  added  that  the  long  delays  of the  U.S.  Administration  in
dealing  with petitions  for  countervailing  and  dumping  actionw  create
uncertainty  for  U.S.  business. For  example,  the  U.S.  Department  of
Commerce  has  still  not  determined  1980  Japanese  dumping  margins  for
television  sets  (New  York  Times,  December  14,  1986).- 11  -
Whereas  average  agricultural  protection  in the  United  States  remained
approximately  nil,  the  extent  of protection  was  high to  begin  with  and
increased  further  subsequently  in the  European  Common  Market  and,  in
particular,  in  Japan  during  the 1960-80  period. Thus,  the  average  nominal
rate  of  protection  on agricultural  products  rose  from  41.1  percent  in 1960  to
83.5  percent  in  Japan  and from  32.8  percent  to 35.7  percent  in  the  European
Common  Market  (Honma  and  Hayami,  1986). Utilising  data  on nominal  rates  of
protection  and  on supply  and  demand  elasticities,  it  has further  been
estimated  that,  in  terms  of 1984  prices,  the  elimination  of nontariff  measures
on agricultural  products  would  lead  to increases  in imports  of $8.8  billion  in
Japan,  $12.4  billion  in the  European  Common  Market  and  $0.5  billion  in the
United  States  (Tyers  and  Anderson,  1986).
Price  comparisons  are  difficult  to  make  for  most  manufactured  goods,
which  are  largely  differentiated  products  that  vary  in  quality  and
specifications.  In  the  absence  of price  comparisons,  then,  one  cannot
appropriately  gauge  the  level  of protection  that  nontariff  measures  on
manufactured  products  provide.  11  However,  the  restrictiveness  of  nontariff
measures  may  be indicated  in  an indirect  way.  For  this  purpose,  use  has  been
made  of data  on the  share  of imports  from  developing  countries  in the  domestic
consumption  of  manufactured  goods  in  the  industrial  countries  (the  import
penetration  ratio).
Table  3  provides  information  on the  share  of imports  from  the
developing  countries  in  the  domestic  consumption  of  manufactured  goods  in the
1/  On the  unreliability  of  existing  estimates,  see  Balassa  and  Balassa,
1984.- 12  -
United  States,  the  European  Common  Market,  and  Japan  for  the  years  1973,  1978,
1983,  1985,  and  1987. The  data  show  that,  during  the  period  under
consideration,  the  import-penetration  ratio  for  manurfactured  goods  increased
the  most in  the  United  States,  followed  by the  European  Common  Market  and,
much  behind,  Japan. Thus,  while  the  ratio  rose  from 1.1  percent  in 1973  to
4.6  percent  in 1983  in the  United  States,  the increases  were from  0.9  to  2.7
percent  in  the  European  Common  Market  and from  0.7  to 1.2  percent  in  Japan.
It  appears,  then,  that  although  Japan  is  not  party  to the  MFA  and  has
few  formal  barriers  to imports  from  the  developing  countries  (the  major
exception  being  footwear),  it  has increasingly  lagged  behind  the  other  major
industrial  countries  in importing  manufactured  goods  from  the  developing
countries. Yet,  with its  rapid  economic  growth  and  the  accumulation  of
physical  and  human  capital,  Japan  has  approached  the  other  industrial
countries  in terms  of factor  endowments,  and  one  would  thus  have  expected  it
to resemble  their  import  pattern  more  closely. The  fact  that  the  opposite  has
happened  may  be taken  as an indication  of the  use  of informal  measures  of
protection  against  developing  country  exports  in  Japan.
Nor  can  one  explain  the  results  by the  overvaluation  of the  U.S.
dollar  relative  to the  European  and  Japanese  currencies.  1!  In  fact,  the  rise
of import  penetration  ratios  decelerated  in the  United  States  during  the  1983-
85 period  when the  bulk  of the  dollar's  appreciation  occurred  and it
accelerated  between  1985  and  1987  when  the  dollar  depreciated.  Also,  similar
1/  This  conclusion  is  supported  by statistical  evidence  for  the  industrial
countries,  which  does  not show  the  existence  of a correlation  between
changes  in import  penetration  ratios  and  in real  effective  exchange  rates
(Balassa,  1986b).- 13 -
Table 3
Relative Importance of Manufactured Imports from Developing Countries
Import-Penetration  Ratio
(in current prices)
1973  1978  1983  1985  1987
United States  1.1  1.8  3.0  3.4  4.6
European Common Market  0.9  1.6  2.1  2.6  2.7
Japan  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.3
Sources: 1973, 1978, and 1983 GATT, International  Trade; United Nations,
Yearbook of Industrial Statistics and OECD, Indicators  of Industrial
Activity, various years.  1985 and 1987 GATT and OECD data tapes.- 14  -
changes  in  real  effective  exchange  rates  in the  European  Common  Market  and
Japan  were  accompanied  by differential  changes  in import  penetration  ratios,
and  the  appreciation  of their  currencies  between  1985  and  1987  was  accompanied
by a slowdown  in  the  rise  of import  penetration  ratios.  I/
The  observed  differences  in import  penetration  cannot  be explained  by
the  availability  of natural  resources  or  other  objective  factors  either. This
is  apparent  from  comparisons  of actual  and  hypothetical  imports  of
manufactured  goods  from  the  developing  countries,  the  latter  being  determined
by per  capita  incomes,  population,  transportation  costs,  and the  availability
of natural  resources. The  results  show  Japan  to  be an "outlier,"  with  actual
imports  falling  short  of  hypothetical  imports  by a substantial  margin  (Balassa
and  Noland,  1988).  2/
IV.  Conclusions
We  have seen  that  average  agricultural  protection  has  remained
practically  nil  in the  United  States  while  rising  over  time  in the  European
Common  Market  and,  even  more,  in  Japan. It further  appears  that  manufactured
imports  from  developing  countries  have  increased  much  more  rapidly,  and
reached  higher  levels,  in  the  United  States  than  in  the  European  Common  Market
and, in  particular,  Japan.
1/  The  result  pertaining  to  Japan  may appear  surprising  in  view  of the  off-
cited  rise  in  Japanese  imports  of  manufactured  goods  from  the  developing
countries. But  the  trade  data  are  measured  in  terms  of U.S.  dollars  and
the  increase  in terms  of  yen,  relevant  for  making  comparisons  with  the
domestic  consumption  of  manufactured  goods,  was  attenuated  by the
appreciation  of the  yen  vis-a-vis  the  dollar.
2/  The same  results  have  been  obtained  in regard  to total  imports  as well  as
for  primary  imports.- 15  -
The  U.S.-Japan  comparisons  for  manufactured  goods  do not  conform  to
the  data  on the  extent  of nontariff  barriers,  as  measured  by the  share  of
imports  from  the  developing  countries  which  are  subject  to such  barriers. The
solution  to the  puzzle  lies  in part  in the  inadequacies  of data  on the  share
of imports  subject  to  nontariff  measures  for  gauging  the  protective  effects  of
these  measures  and  in  part in  the  reliance  on formal  measures  of protection  in
the  United  States  as against  the  use  of informal  measures  in  Japan.
The  data  of  Table  1  on the  share  of imports  subject  to nontariff
measures  indicate  scope  of the  application  of these  measures  but  not  their
protective  effect. Thus,  a particular  commodity  category  being  subject  to
nontariff  measures  is compatible  with  widely  different  levels  of imports.
Also,  the  United  States  has traditionally  used  formal  measures  of protection
while  Japan  and,  to a lesser  extent,  European  countries  have  relied  on
informal  measures  that  are  difficult  to evaluate.
More  generally,  one  may  explain  the  results  obtained  by reference  to
the  openness  of the  U.S.  market  that  has  generally  been  more  hospitable  to
imports  from  developing  countries  than  the  markets  of other  industrial
countries,  in  particular  Japan. Despite  attempts  made to increase
restrictions  in  recent  years,  this  has  also  been  the  case  for  textiles  and
clothing,  where  developing  countries  have  in large  part  gotten  around  the
regulations  by introducing  new fibers,  such  as ramie,  as  well  as upgrading
products.
This  is  not  to say  that  one  should  underestimate  the  danger  of
protectionist  pressures  in the  United  States. While  President  Reagan  vetoed
the  highly-protectionist  textile  bills  prepared  in  a two  years'  interval,
protectionist  pressures  remain  strong  in  Congress. It is  necessary,- 16  -
therefore,  to combat  these  pressures  by emphasizing  the  economic  as  well  as
the  political  advantages  of an open  trade  system  for  the  United  States. It
should  further  be noted  that  the  '.ighly-indebted  developing  countries  need
markets  so that  they  can  continue  servicing  their  loans.- 17 -
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